The ones running thing follow a radical branch of Sharia that even the Iotala Komaniy had most killed as they are farther out then he was. Called the 12-Er's.
Read this.
Background
According to Shi’ite tradition, the Twelve Imams, descendants
of the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law
Ali Ibn Abi Talib, were endowed with divine qualities that
enabled them to lead the Shi’ite believers and to function
as Allah’s emissaries on earth. However, when the Twelfth
Imam Muhammad Al-Mahdi1 disappeared in 941 CE, his
connection with the Shi’ite believers was severed, and since
then, the Shi’ites are commanded to await his return at any
time.
In the meantime, Shi’ite senior clerics are considered to be
the representatives of the Imams, and thus have the authority
to handle the affairs of the Shi’ite community, mainly
in the religious and judicial spheres, until the Hidden Imam
returns to lead the Shi’ite community and deliver it from its
suffering.
According to Shi’ite belief, during the period of the Mahdi’s
absence (termed ghaibat or “occultation”), no one but
God knows the hour of the Mahdi’s return, and no man
can presume to foresee when this hour will come. Upon
the Mahdi’s reappearance, all wrongs will be righted, divine
justice will be instated, and the truth of Shi’ite Islam will be
acknowledged by the entire world. (Mahdism)2
Mahdism and the Islamic
Regime i n Iran
From the establishment of the Islamic Regime in 1979 to
Ahmadinejad’s rise to power in August 2005, Mahdism had
been a religious doctrine and a tradition that had no political
manifestation. The political system operated independently
of this messianic belief and of the anticipation of the return
of the Mahdi. It was only with Ahmadinejad’s presidency
that this religious doctrine has become a political philosophy
and taken a central place in politics.
During the era of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of
Iran’s Islamic regime, Mahdism remained outside the political
realm. However, Khomeini’s era was nonetheless characterized
by messianic fervor. The Iranians attributed messianic
qualities to him, and conferred upon him the title of
“Imam,” which until then had been reserved for the Twelve
Imams. In fact, Khomeini’s rise to power was seen at the
time as the realization of the prophecy regarding the Mahdi’s
return.
Khomeini’s instatement of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-
e faqih) in Iran prompted a transformation in Shi’ism,
replacing its traditional passivity with a more active outlook.
As part of this change, Khomeini stated that the Shi’ites
must not just passively await the return of the Mahdi, but
must actively prepare the ground for his return and for the
deliverance of the Shi’ite community. One component of
this active approach was the taking of power by the clerics.
However, Khomeini kept the doctrine of Mahdism at the
periphery of the political sphere. He neither claimed to have
a direct connection with God, nor presumed to foresee the
hour of the Mahdi’s return.
After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Mahdism declined in Iran.
The administrations of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-
1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) maintained
strict separation between politics and Mahdism – a policy
that would change with Ahmadinejad ‘s presidency.3
This document reviews the politicization of Mahdism by
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and by his spiritual
mentor Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah-e Yazdi, and presents
some of the reactions to it in Iran’s political and intellectual
circles.
Ahmadinejad’s
Messianic Policy –
Main C haracteristics
Immediately upon assuming the presidency, Ahmadinejad
began to assert his belief in the imminent return of the
Mahdi as the basis for his political activities. Despite the traditional
belief that no one can foresee the hour of the Mahdi’s
return, Ahmadinejad frequently stated that his coming
was nigh, and even gave a more specific prediction. During
a meeting with the foreign minister of an Islamic country, he
said that the crisis in Iran “presaged the coming of the Hidden
Imam, who would appear within the next two years.”4
In a December 2006 speech in Kermanshah, Ahmadinejad
wished the Christians a merry Christmas and said: “I hereby
announce that, with God’s help, the day is not far off when
Jesus will return at the side of the Hidden Imam.”5
Not only has Ahmadinejad wished to proclaim the imminent
coming of the Mahdi, and thereby to legitimize his policy
and actions by associating them with Hidden Imam - but
he has also presented himself as being directly connected
to God. In a recent speech about Iran’s nuclear program,
he claimed to have “a connection with God,” and exhorted
the Iranians to be true believers so that God would support
them in their just struggle for nuclear technology:
“Believe [me], legally speaking, and in the eyes of public
opinion, we have absolutely succeeded. I say this out of
knowledge. Someone asked me: ‘So and so said that you
have a connection.’ I said: ‘Yes, I have.’ He asked me: ‘Really,
you have a connection? With whom?’ I answered: ‘I have a
MEMRI - The Doctrine of Mahdism
connection with God,’ since God said that the infidels will
have no way to harm the believers. Well, [but] only if we are
believers, because God said: You [will be] the victors. But
the same friends say that Ahmadinejad says strange things.
“If we are [really] believers, God will show us victory, and
this miracle. Is it necessary today for a she-camel to emerge
from the heart of the mountain6 so that my friends will accept
the miracle? Wasn’t the [Islamic] Revolution [enough
of] a miracle? Wasn’t the Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] a miracle?...
“7
Ahmadinejad has also presented himself as being privy to
God’s intentions and actions, as reflected in his statement
that “God has appointed the Hidden Imam to be our supporter.”
8 His claim of having a direct relationship with God
was also evident in the speech he made upon his return to
Iran after addressing the U.N. General Assembly in 2005.
Ahmadinejad claimed that, as he was delivering his U.N. address,
he felt himself “surrounded by a halo of light” symbolizing
the messianic nature of his message to the nations
of the world.9
Ahmadinejad’s speeches have been characterized by the use
of messianic terms and by emphasis on the need to prepare
the ground for the Mahdi’s return.10 For example, in a May
2007 speech in Kerman province, he said: “We have a mission
- to turn Iran into the country of the Hidden Imam.”11
As part of their commitment to these preparations, and at
the suggestion of senior Ahmadinejad aide Parviz Daoudi,
the Iranian ministers signed a pledge of allegiance to the
Hidden Imam during the government’s first session, along
with the pledge of allegiance to Ahmadinejad.12
In accordance with his messianic policy, Ahmadinejad has
also endorsed an Iranian-Shi’ite folk tradition which maintains
that the Hidden Imam attaches special importance to
the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom – a tradition that has not
been supported by the conservative religious establishment.
13 As part of this policy, Iranian Minister of Culture
and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi
was ordered to drop the ministers’ pledge of allegiance into
a well in the courtyard of the Jamkaran Mosque, where believers
drop prayers and personal requests. Ahmadinejad has
also allocated $10 million for renovating the mosque and
its surroundings in preparation for the return of the Mahdi,
and in 2005, he spent some $8 million on refreshments for
pilgrims during the celebration of the Mahdi’s birthday.14
The regime’s encouragement of Mahdism is also evident in
content on the website of Iran’s government broadcasting
service. For example, the site presents information on the
Iranian TV series “The World Toward Illumination,” which
deals with the imminent arrival of the Mahdi.15
It should be noted that political manifestations of Ahmadinejad’s
messianic beliefs were evident even prior to his
election to the presidency. According to reports, during
his term as mayor of Tehran (2003-2005), the municipality
printed a city map which showed, among other things, the
route that will be taken by the Mahdi upon his return.16
At the International Seminar on the Doctrine of Mahdism,
held in Iran September 6-7, 2006 during the celebrations
for the Mahdi’s birthday, and attended by representatives
of various countries, Ahmadinejad emphasized the universal
and active nature of Mahdism and called on the West to
accept it: “Today mankind is proceeding towards the truth.
Today the happiness of mankind depends on proceeding
towards the truth. Today we invite everyone to proceed
towards the truth, since [the truth] is the only way... This
celebration [of the Mahdi’s birthday] is not only for Muslims
but for the entire world. The Mahdi belongs to all of mankind...
“The Hidden Imam has no tangible presence among us, but
he is always [here], and we must prepare the ground for his
speedy appearance... Some claim that during his occultation,
his [nobility] is suspended, but that is not true... On the
contrary, we must rush towards him and hasten to prepare
the ground for his appearance. [He will not appear] if we sit
idly. Mankind must hurry towards the Hidden Imam in order
to reach him. A person who [actively hastens the coming of
the Imam] is different from one who does not... Today, mankind
is proceeding rapidly towards perfection, truth, justice,
love, peace and compassion, and this is possible only under
the rule of the perfect man [i.e. the Hidden Imam]...”17
Messianism i n Iranian
Foreign Policy
The messianic doctrine of Mahdism is also manifest in Iranian
foreign policy, especially in its attitude towards the
Western superpowers and towards the nuclear program.
Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi, mentor to Ahmadinejad, expressed
this approach in an October 11, 2006 speech: “The
greatest obligation of those awaiting the appearance of the
Mahdi is fighting heresy and global arrogance [i.e. the West,
primarily the U.S.].”18
Ahmadinejad’s speeches are characteristically derisive of the
“forces of arrogance,” i.e., the West, primarily the U.S., and
threatening towards anyone who does not accept Shi’ite
messianism as an alternative to the “perdition and destruction”
awaiting them: “Those who do not respond to the
call to proceed towards the truth – a good destiny does
not await them. I heard that the president of one of those
countries [i.e. U.S. President George Bush]... said that Iran’s
president was threatening him. I say to him: ‘I am not the
one threatening you. It is the entire world that threatens
you, because the world in its entirety is steadfast against
oppression and the oppressors. You [Western countries]
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are nothing compared to the might of God. We invite you
to [take] the righteous path, the path of the Prophets, of
monotheism and justice. If you believe that you can sit in
your glass palaces and determine the fate of the world, you
are mistaken... Our call [to you] to take the direction of truth
[stems] from pity. We do not want you to get into trouble,
since you know that the outcome of oppression and injustice
is perdition and destruction.”19
These characteristics are also evident in Ahmadinejad’s
nuclear policy: In contrast to Khatami’s government,
which endeavored to soften the position of the West on
the nuclear issue via ongoing dialogue, Ahmadinejad and
his close circle do not avoid confronting the West, since
they consider this struggle to be one of the ways to prepare
the ground for the return of the Mahdi.
According to the Internet daily Rooz, “Some of those close
to Ahmadinejad, who frequently speak [of the need] to prepare
the ground for the Mahdi’s return, explicitly link the
[fate of] the Iranian nuclear dossier to this need... According
to reliable information, they stressed, in various private
meetings, that the [Iranian] opposition to global pressure
[on the Iranian nuclear program] and its insistence on the
right to utilize nuclear power are among the ways to prepare
the ground for the return of the [Hidden] Imam.”20
Mahdism i n the Ideology
of A yatollah M ohammad
Taqi M esbah-e Y azdi
The address given at this year’s International Seminar on
the Doctrine of Mahdism by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi
Mesbah-e Yazdi shows that he too regards belief in the
Mahdi as a concept that transcends the religious or theoretical
realm. Ayatollah Yazdi gave this belief a tangible
political-ideological dimension when he explained that
the Mahdi’s return would lead to the establishment of
a single rule over the entire world, and that the present
battle against the infidels and against “the global arrogance”
is preparing the ground for, and hastening, the
coming of the Mahdi:21
“...Implementing the laws of Islam, establishing justice
and fighting heresy and oppression are the most important
duties for those who await [the return of] the Hidden
Imam and prepare the ground for his coming... We
must enhance religious faith and [the power] of religion
in Iran and in the entire world... In order to hasten the
coming of the Hidden Imam, we must disseminate justice
and religious law, in order to increase the public’s awareness
of them [throughout the world], so that the [Shi’ite]
faith will be accepted by society [everywhere]...
“One of the ideological aspects of the Mahdist doctrine is
[its] universality, since the Mahdi comes to establish justice
and righteousness in the entire world. Another aspect is the
dissemination of justice and righteousness [under the rule
of] a single man, a single center, and a single system. Since
it is the Hidden Imam who is responsible for disseminating
righteousness and justice, the world will need to have a
single center and government... so that it will emerge from
a state of [division] and establish a single [universal] rule
headed by the [Hidden Imam], and every kind of oppression
and exploitation will [then] vanish from the world...”
In a 2006 speech marking the Mahdi’s birthday, Ayatollah
Mesbah-e Yazdi emphasized the importance of fighting
heresy, which, in his opinion, is delaying the coming of the
Mahdi: “...Our noblest duty is to strive to reduce oppression,
to be more [stringent] in our implementation of Islamic
law... and to weaken the control of oppressive and tyrannical
regimes over the oppressed. These [actions] can [hasten]
the return of the Hidden Imam... If we wish to expedite the
Mahdi’s coming, we must remove any obstacles [delaying
his return]. What are the obstacles delaying the appearance
of the Mahdi? [The are] the [heretical] denial of the blessing
[conferred] on society by the presence of the Imam, [as
well as] ingratitude, insubordination, and objections [to the
doctrine of Mahdism]. If we want to hasten the coming of
the Mahdi, we must eliminate these obstacles. We must
strive to instate greater justice, ensure a [more stringent]
implementation of Islamic law, [bring] the people to take
greater interest in the faith and its directives, [establish] the
religious laws as the dominant [values] of society, [ensure]
that religious faith be taken as a consensus at conferences,
and limit the [control of the oppressors, i.e. of the Western
powers] over the oppressed throughout the world – both
Muslim and non-Muslim. [This is what we must do] in order
to prepare the ground for the Mahdi’s coming. Thus, the
greatest obligation of those awaiting the appearance of the
Mahdi is fighting heresy and global arrogance.”22
Supp ort f rom
Conservative-Revolutionary
Ci rcles f or the
Politicization of the
Mahdist D octrine
The politicization of the doctrine of Mahdism has found
support among conservative circles and certain sectors in
the security forces that belong to the ideological camp of
Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah-e Yazdi, which brought Ahmadinejad
to power. The weekly Parto-ye Sokhan, for example, stated
that “with the advent of the new government, and [due to]
Ahmadinejad’s singular devotion to the Hidden Imam and
his heir, the people of the West and [the Iranian] dissidents
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fear a rise in Mahdism not only in Iran but throughout the
world... [They fear this] because they see Ahmadinejad taking
every opportunity and using every platform to spread
this doctrine... so that the blessed name of the Mahdi is
reaching the ears of all the people of the world, [even] from
the world’s most exalted political pulpit – the U.N. [Assembly
Hall].”23 Parto-ye Sokhan characterized Ahmadinejad’s
mention of the Mahdi in his U.N. speech as “one of [his]
foreign policy successes.”24
After Ahmadinejad’s rise to power, Ayatollah Yazdi’s pupil
and spokesman Qassem Ravanbakhsh expressed his hope
that “during Ahmadinejad’s term in office, religious laws
that were suspended and religious values that became weak
[during the era of presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani]... will
once again receive [due] attention in order to prepare the
ground for the arrival of the Hidden Imam. Ravanbakhsh
also rejected the claim that Ahmadinejad is not fit to be
president because he is not a cleric, saying that being a cleric
“is not a requirement for [serving the people].” To support
this point, he stated that “in previous administrations – such
as that of Khatami, who is a cleric – it was the presidency
that dealt the worst blows to Islamic values.”25
Support for Ahmadinejad’s policy also came from the conservative
group called Ansar-e Hizbullah. A spokesman, Ali
Davani, said at one of the group’s weekly meetings that
Ahmadinejad’s U.N. address in 2005 “was one of the signs
[heralding the imminent] return of the Hidden Imam.”26
Fatemeh Rajabi, who is affiliated with Ansar-e Hizbullah
and who authored a book about Ahmadinejad titled The
Miracle of the Third Millennium, said that the “Ahmadinejad
government [was established to facilitate] the coming of the
Hidden Imam.”
Clerics C riticize
Ahmadinejad’s M essianic
Policies
Ahmadinejad’s messianic policies have drawn growing criticism
from ayatollahs and senior religious figures in the religious
seminaries in Qom who oppose the politicization of
the messianic doctrine. Two articles published in the daily
Jomhouri-ye Eslami, the newspaper of the religious seminaries
in Qom which represents the views of important Ayatollahs
from the seminaries, emphasized the danger posed
to the Shi’ite faith by the encouragement of messianic messages
and by their propagation by Ahmadinejad, his supporters,
and, by implication, Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi as
well – a group they label “the spreaders of superstitions”:
1. Jomhouri-ye Eslami: S uperficial Propaganda
“Exposes S ociety to the D anger of S piritual
Weakness and [Leads to] L ack of Faith in the
Fundamentals of R eligion”
In a September 13, 2006 editorial titled “The Danger of Superstitions:
The Task of the Elected [Officials],” Jomhouri-ye
Eslami expressed reservations about turning the Jamkaran
Mosque into a holy site of the highest level of sanctity, and
expressed doubt as to the validity of the traditions tying the
mosque to the Hidden Imam. The article stated that clerics
should fight the danger posed to Shi’ism and to Shi’ites by
Ahmadinejad, his supporters, and his messianic policies. The
article even derided Ahmadinejad for presuming to present
himself as having contacts and meetings with the Mahdi,
and accused him of destroying the faith:
“…Look at the ceremonies in the middle of the month of
Sha’ban [celebrating the birth of the Mahdi]. The faith in
the promised Mahdi, as expressed in Shi’ite culture and
education, is the most advanced and most spiritual of religious
beliefs. The Iranian people are arduously preparing
themselves for this great day… But in essence, what is the
benefit of all this preparation in terms of the people’s spiritual
growth and the advancement of their level of religious
thought and culture? What pure religious knowledge fills
the thirsty mouths of the public, which tenaciously turns [to
the sources of Shi’ite jurisprudence] in order to quench its
thirst?...
“Unfortunately, the true answer is that we are not just failing
to quench the people’s [thirst] with pure spirituality and
pure religious knowledge, but, on the contrary, we are filling
[their heads] with the greatest possible amount of idiotic
beliefs, superficialities and falsities. Uneducated [people]
have come to control the celebrations [of the Mahdi’s
birthday], and they are instilling the masses with a material
[approach] that is unacceptable in both ideological and material
terms. [These people rely] on the prestige of the religious
leadership [an allusion to Ayatollah Mesbah-e Yazdi],
in opposition to the clear view of the Supreme Leader [Ali
Khamenei] and of the senior clerics, who are the sources of
religious authority in Shi’ism…
“This criticism… is a warning that comes to explain... that
the propagation of a superficial view and of superstitions
– especially in the field of religious knowledge – [exposes]
society to the danger of spiritual weakness and [leads] to
lack of faith in the fundamentals of religion…
“When we raise the sanctity of the Jamkaran Mosque to
the point where it is presented as more important than
mosques like the Holy Mosque [in Mecca], the Prophet’s
Mosque [in Medina]... the Al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem],
the Kufa Mosque [in Iraq] and the Sahla Mosque [in Iraq]…
and when it is announced that some three million pilgrims
came to this mosque on the holiday of the Mahdi’s birthday;
when they drag the people, who are thirsting for spirituality,
from every corner of the country to Jamkaran, using the
unprecedented propaganda [employed by Ahmadinejad]…
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and when speeches of praise and thanksgiving [are made]
in which the people are promised that the Hidden Imam will
make the pilgrimage to [the Jamkaran Mosque]… we know,
of course, that there will be no pilgrimage or anything else.
“How long will people continue to believe this propaganda
before their faith is eventually shaken and emptied [of content]?...
On what basis is [the Jamkaran Mosque] associated
with all the propaganda, the miracles, and the [special] status
[that is attributed to it], which are instilled among the
people?
“In order to realize the implications of these actions, look
at the people who exploit the superstitions and present
themselves as being in contact with the Mahdi, [the people
who say] that they meet with him, or even that they are the
Mahdi himself. [Then you will realize] what religious beliefs
they have destroyed… how many harmful elements they
have introduced into religion, and what danger lies in superstitions…
The proponents of religion and senior religious
thinkers and scholars must step into the ring and launch
the difficult battle against the danger of superstitions. They
must not rest until they arrive at a clear outcome.”27
2. Jomhouri-ye Eslami: “Myths L ike ‘The H alo
of L ight’… M ake the Fight [Against False Beliefs]
E ven M ore D ifficult”
Another Jomhoui-ye Eslami editorial, published October
11, 2006 under the title “Take this Warning Seriously,” expressed
strong reservations about Ahmadinejad’s messianic
pronouncements and the propagation of popular traditions
tying the Jamkaran Mosque to the Hidden Imam:
“…[It is] saddening that false and idiotic beliefs have recently
received reinforcement backed by force. Myths like
‘the halo of light’ [which Ahmadinejad felt surrounding him
during his U.N. speech]28 and claims of esoteric knowledge
and clairvoyance – coming from people who are supposed,
as one of their tasks, to fight these very things – are making
the battle [against false beliefs] even more difficult...”29
Senior ayatollahs also expressed reservations following the
allocation of huge budgets for projects connected with
the Jamkaran Mosque. Jomhouri-ye Eslami stated: “Most
of the senior ayatollahs are not happy with the worsening
[of the situation] regarding ossified and erroneous [beliefs]
about the Jamkaran Mosque [i.e. the encouragement and
propagation of popular messianic traditions regarding the
Jamkaran Mosque]. Some time ago, one of the ayatollahs in
Qom vigorously opposed the erroneous steps [being taken]
in this mosque, like the [practice of] writing personal requests
[to the Hidden Imam] and dropping them into the
well near the mosque…” In addition, there were reports of
the Qom seminaries’ angry reactions to the fact that development
funds allocated to the district were intended largely
for developing the Jamkaran Mosque.30
3. A yatollah M ontazeri: “The Fact T hat We Believe
in [The Future A ppearance of] the H idden
Imam D oes N ot M ean that S ome [Government
Officials] S hould E xploit H is N ame for Politics
In a January 31, 2006 interview, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
who is considered one of the most senior religious
authorities in the Shi’ite world and in Iran, expressed his
disgust at the political capital that Ahmadinejad is trying
to derive from the name of the Mahdi.31 In the interview,
Montazeri noted that “the fact that we believe in [the future
appearance of] the Hidden Imam does not mean that some
[government officials] should exploit his name for politics. I
am opposed to this kind of exploitation. The exploitation of
the holy names causes the people and the younger generation
to be disgusted with religion, since there is no flaw in
the essence of Islam, and every flaw that exists [due to exploitation
of religion] will hurt our Islam… In the early days
of the Islamic Revolution, the people shouted slogans like:
‘Independence, freedom and Islamic Republic’… [The term]
Islamic [means] based on the fundamentals of Islam —Islam
in which the qualified [authorities] are religious authorities,
great and wise people, and not [Islam] in which anybody
who has a little learning [immediately] wishes to express an
opinion on Islamic issues…”32
RE FORM IST INTELECTUALS
CR ITICIZE the Politicization
of Mahdism
Intellectual Mohsen Kadivar: “Hasn’t the Time Come for
[the Ayatollahs] and the Clerics to Clarify Their Position
on These Claims?”
The intellectual and cleric Mohsen Kadivar pointed to the
danger posed to Islam by Ahmadinejad’s messianic leanings.
In a speech on the occasion of Eid Al-Fitr, Kadivar criticized
the incorporation of the Mahdist doctrine in Ahmadinejad’s
political platform. The report was originally published by
the ILNA news agency, and is cited on Kadivar’s website:
“[Kadivar said:] ‘We can point to the past year as the heyday
of religious nonsense.’ [He] sharply criticized the proud declarations
by [government officials] that ‘the number of visitors
to the fictitious place (i.e. the well at Jamkaran Mosque)
is several times larger than the number of pilgrims [visiting]
the grave of the eighth Imam [Reza, in the city of Mashhad].’
[Kadivar] described this calamity as ‘the result of propaganda
for false beliefs,’ saying that ‘as long as the regime
propagates false beliefs, we should naturally expect [these
beliefs] to become more and more prevalent in the country.’
Kadivar declared that ‘[claims that the Hidden Imam] gives
special attention to the Ahmadinejad government are a sign
of the propagation of false beliefs... Hasn’t the time come
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for [the ayatollahs] and the clerics to clarify their position on
these claims?’”33
Intellectual Hashem Aghajari: “In the Era of the Mahdi’s
Occultation, No One Can Claim to a Have Prophetic Mission
or to Represent Him”
Hashem Aghajari, the academic who has twice received a
death sentence for challenging the religious establishment
in Iran and calling for religious reform, criticized Ahmadinejad
for his professed connection with the Hidden Imam. In
a speech to students at Amir Kabir University in Tehran on
marking Laylat Al-Qadr,34 Aghajari said: “… We are today
in the era of [the Hidden Imam’s] occultation, and since the
Prophet [Muhammad] was the Seal of the Prophets, and
the Mahdi is the last of the Imams – and he is in occultation
– no one else can claim [to have] a prophetic mission or
to represent [the Hidden Imam], nor can they base themselves
on such a prophetic mission... in order to rule over
the people…”35
Spokesman for the R eformist M ojahedin-e E nqelab-
e E slami Party: “When S ome in the G overnment…
S ay T hat the H idden Imam Will Be
Revealed in the C oming T wo Y ears, T his H as
No R esult O ther T han to Weaken the Faith of
the M asses”
Mohsen Armin, former member of the Sixth Majlis and
speaker for the reformist Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Eslami
Party, came out strongly against statements attributed to
Ahmadinejad that the Hidden Imam will be revealed in the
next two years: “When some in the government are planning
to prepare the ground [for the Mahdi’s coming] and
say that the Hidden Imam will be revealed in the coming
two years, this has no result other than to weaken the faith
of the masses. The propagation of such statements by private
parties endangers our future…”36
* A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project; Y.
Mansharof is a research fellow at MEMRI.
Notes
1 The Twelfth Imam, the Shi’ite messiah, is also called Muhammad
Al-Muntazar (“the expected”), Imam Al- Zaman (“The Imam of the
Age”) and “the Hidden Imam.”
2 Sobh-e Sadeq (Iran), April 30, 2007.
3For details about Ahmadinejad’s rise to power and about the
“Second Islamic Revolution,” see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No.
253, “The ‘Second Islamic Revolution’ in Iran: Power Struggle at
the Top,” November 17, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Pa
ge=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA25305
4Aftab (Iran), November 16, 2005, quoted in Rooz (Iran), December
12, 2005.
5Emrooz (Iran), December 20,2006.
6This refers to a Koranic verse (7:73).
7Iran News (Iran), October 15, 2006. For more information on
Ahmadinejad’s claims regarding his connection with God, see
MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1328, “Iran President Ahmadinejad:
‘I Have a Connection With God, Since God Said That the Infidels
Will Have No Way to Harm the Believers’; ‘We Have [Only] One
Step Remaining Before We Attain the Summit of Nuclear Technology’;
The West ‘Will Not Dare To Attack Us,’” October 19, 2006,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP
132806.
8Fars (Iran), April 1, 2007.
9Rooz (Iran), October 1, 2006.
10Aftab, (Iran), May 10, 2007
11For examples, see Kayhan, September 29, 2005; Fars news
agency, October 11, 2005; Sharq, November 12, 2005; ISNA news
agency, November 16, 2005; IRNA news agency, April 16, 2006;
Kayhan, November 23, 2006; Emrooz, December 20, 2006; Jomhouri-
ye Eslami, December 24, 2006.
12ILNA (Iran), October 17, 2005.
13Shi’ite scholars are divided regarding the status of this mosque.
The daily Jomhouri-ye Eslami, which is affiliated with the religious
seminaries in Qom and which represents the views of important
Ayatollahs from the seminaries, stated that the mosque is no different
than any other (September 13, 2006), while the weekly
Parto-ye Sokhan, affiliated with Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-
e Yazdi, cited the traditional belief that the mosque had been
built at the order of the Hidden Imam and that it holds special
importance for him (September 20, 2006).
14The Shi’ites celebrate the birthday of the Hidden Imam on the
15th day of the Muslim month of Sha’ban, which, in 2006, coincided
with September.
15See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1436, “ Waiting for the Mahdi:
Official Iranian Eschatology Outlined in Public Broadcasting Program
in Iran,” January 25, 2007, http://memri.org/bin/articles.
cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP143607.
16The reports stated that “the distribution of a distorted map...
showing the route [that will be taken] by the Mahdi [upon his return]
has been stopped [following critical] reactions from political
and religious circles. The map was distributed by Tehran municipality...
but the copies were soon recalled following [criticism] by
senior officials in the regime.” (Hatef website – apparently the
website Hatef News, associated with supporters of Rafsanjani
– December 5, 2005, quoted in Rooz, December 5, 2005).
17ISNA (Iran), September 6, 2006.
18Parto-ye Sokhan (Iran), October 11, 2006.
19ISNA (Iran), September 6, 2006, http://www.isna.ir/Main/News-
View.aspx?ID=News-784304&Lang=P.
10 MEMRI - The Doctrine of Mahdism
20Rooz, October 16, 2006, as cited by the Entekhab website
on October 16, 2006, http://www.entekhab.ir/display/
?ID=6760&page=1.
21Kayhan (Iran), September 10, 2006.
22Parto-ye Sokhan (Iran), October 11, 2006.
23Parto-ye Sokhan (Iran), March 1, 2006.
24Parto-ye Sokhan (Iran), October 9, 2005.
25ILNA (Iran), August 9, 2005.
26Ruidad, September 25, 2005, as quoted in Rooz, December5,
2005.
27Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Iran), September 13, 2006; On September
20, 2006, Qassem Ravanbakhsh published an article in Parto-ye
Sokhan in which he denied Jomhouri-ye Eslami’s accusations.
28The reference is to Ahmadinejad’s claim that he felt that he was
surrounded by a halo of light when he spoke at the U.N. General
Assembly in September, 2005.
29Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Iran), October 11, 2006.
30Ruidad, August 13, 2005, as reported in Rooz, December 5,
2005.
31Ayatollah Montazeri was removed from the line of succession by
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, following his expression of
criticism of the regime’s violations of human rights.
32From Montazeri’s website: http://www.amontazeri.com/Farsi/
Payamha/90.htm.
33From Kadivar’s website, http://www.kadivar.com/Index.asp?Doc
Id=1571&AC=1&AF=1&ASB=1&AGM=1&AL=1&DT=dtv.
34According to Muslim tradition, Laylat Al-Qadr marks the beginning
of Muhammad’s prophetic revelation.
35ISNA, October 23, 2005.
36Rooz, October 18, 2005. In addition, in a Rooz article from January
30, 2006, the intellectual ‘Abd Al-Karim Soroush accused Ayatollah
Mesbah-e Yazdi of “educating [people] to an extremist and
incorrect use of [the name of] the Hidden Imam, and in general of
using religion as an instrument.”
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