I don't know how many times this needs explaining!
Ted Kennedy did not get 2,700 troops killed by illegally and unilaterally attacking a sovereign nation. Only the UN Security Council, which we are on, can issue that type of order. Not resolutions that went back to the early 1990's!
Bushe wiped out most of his weapons in Kuwait in 1993, we knew he had weapons then, we gave them to him or arranged for him to have them. Did he use them on any US troops? No!
Then:Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s
(Letter Report, 02/07/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-98).
This unclassified version of a classified 1992 GAO report discusses U.S.
policy and practices on sales of U.S. military equipment to Iraq during
the 1980s. Since 1980, U.S. policy has been to deny export licenses for
commercial sales of defense items to Iraq, and the Pentagon has not made
any foreign military sales to Iraq since 1967. In contrast, U.S. policy
on sales to Iraq of dual-use items--items with both civilian and
military uses--has not been constrained by security controls. As a
result, the Commerce Department approved licenses for exporting $1.5
billion worth of dual-use items between 1985 and 1990. The licensed
items included computers and other high-tech equipment, civilian
helicopters, and machine tools. In addition, several countries shipped
U.S. military equipment to Iraq without U.S. approval, including
ammunition and howitzer spare parts. In five cases, countries proposed
that they serve as transshipment points for military equipment for Iraq,
proposals that the State Department rejected.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-98
TITLE: Iraq: U.S. Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq
in the 1980s
DATE: 02/07/94
SUBJECT: Arms control agreements
Export regulation
International trade regulation
International trade restriction
Foreign military sales policies
Foreign trade policies
Foreign military sales
Military materiel
Foreign governments
Dual-use technologies
IDENTIFIER: Iraq
Middle East
United Arab Emirates
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
TOW Missile
C-130 Aircraft
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives
February 1994
IRAQ - U.S. MILITARY ITEMS
EXPORTED OR TRANSFERRED TO IRAQ IN
THE 1980S
GAO/NSIAD-94-98
IRAQ
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
UAE - United Arab Emirates
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-256123
February 7, 1994
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are providing you with this unclassified version of our classified
report dated March 11, 1992, addressed to you as Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House of
Representatives, and to the Honorable Mel Levine, a Member of
Congress at that time. The Honorable John M. Spratt Jr., Chairman,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs, Committee
on Government Operations, House of Representatives, requested that
the report be declassified. The Departments of State, Defense, and
Commerce reviewed the report and agreed that it could be issued in
its present form. We are sending a copy of the report to Chairman
Spratt.
In response to your request, we made this review because of concerns
that certain Middle East countries may have served as transshipment
points for U.S. arms ultimately bound for Iraq, and our 1989
classified report findings that three other countries made
unauthorized sales of coproduced equipment to Iran and Iraq.
Our objectives were to determine (1) what the U.S. policy and
practices were regarding sales of U.S. military and related
equipment to Iraq during the 1980s and what sales were approved, (2)
whether there were patterns of diversion of U.S. arms from the
Middle East and three additional countries to Iraq during the 1980s,
and (3) whether a shipment of U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses was
diverted from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Iraq.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Since 1980, U.S. policy has been to deny export licenses for
commercial sales of defense items to Iraq, except when the items were
for the protection of the head of state. As a result of the
exception, license applications valued at $48 million were approved.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not made any foreign military
sales to Iraq since 1967. In contrast, U.S. policy toward Iraq for
sales of dual-use items (items that have both civilian and military
uses) was not constrained by national security controls, and there
were few applicable foreign policy controls until August 1990. Thus,
the Department of Commerce approved the licenses for exporting $1.5
billion of dual-use items to Iraq between 1985 and 1990.
Available information showed two cases of unauthorized transfers of
U.S. military items to Iraq by Middle East countries. Although
three other Middle East countries and one of the other countries had
proposed to serve as transshipment points of military equipment for
Iraq, the proposals were turned down by the Department of State.
There were also two additional cases of diversion to Iraq by two of
the three other countries, and one case of possible diversion-related
activity by the third. While this data does not suggest patterns of
diversion, we were unable to determine whether other unauthorized
transfers were made.
Because of sovereign political sensitivities, we were unable to visit
UAE to conduct a physical inspection; therefore, we could not
determine whether the U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE
were diverted to Iraq. We, therefore, recommended that the U.S.
Ambassador use an alternative method to verify that the fuses are
still in UAE's possession. After issuance of our classified report,
the U.S. Embassy in UAE reported that its personnel verified that
the U.S.-origin mortar bomb fuses shipped to UAE were not diverted to
Iraq.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
U.S. exports of defense articles and services on the U.S. munitions
list are controlled by the Department of State under the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, as amended. When foreign governments or parties
wish to purchase defense articles and services directly from U.S.
firms, the firms must obtain export licenses from the Department of
State. License applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account that exports to Communist countries and
terrorist-supporting countries are prohibited. If, however, the
foreign parties elect to make such purchases through DOD's foreign
military sales, which are subject to DOD approval, export licenses
are generally not necessary. Written approval must be obtained from
the Department of State before a defense article or service
previously exported from the United States can be transferred to a
third country. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the State
Department is required to notify Congress of any substantial
violations involving unauthorized transfers.
U.S. exports and reexports\1 of dual-use items are controlled and
licensed by Commerce under the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended. Controls are based on national security and foreign policy
considerations. National security controls are maintained on
strategic commodities and technical data, worldwide, to prevent the
diversion of such items to controlled countries. Controls based on
foreign policy considerations are maintained to further U.S. foreign
policy goals. License applications for exports subject to national
security controls can be referred to DOD for review, whereas those
subject to foreign policy controls can be referred to State for
review. Other departments and agencies, such as the Department of
Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Subgroup on Nuclear
Export Coordination, can also participate in licensing decisions.
--------------------
\1 A controlled commodity previously exported from the United States
to a foreign destination that is to be reexported from the foreign
country requires approval from the U.S. government.
U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICES
REGARDING SALES OF MUNITIONS
LIST ITEMS TO IRAQ
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Commercial sales of munitions list items to Iraq required
State-approved licenses. Since 1980, U.S. policy prohibited
licensing sales of munitions list items to Iraq, except when the
items were for the protection of the head of state. The policy was
based on the rationale that the United States should not aid either
belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War. According to State officials, the
exception for protection of the head of state was used to sell Iraq
items that would not increase Iraqi military capability and items
that had low risk of being diverted to the Iraqi military.
Between 1983 and 1990, State approved 19 license applications, mostly
for sales of communication devices, valued at $48 million and
disapproved 25 licenses valued at $2.6 million. However, according
to State officials, 4 of the 19 licenses approved in July 1990,
valued at $43 million, were revoked immediately after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and no items were shipped.
Approved items and their stated end uses for 11 of the 19 approved
licenses are detailed in appendix I. In two of the approved cases,
the Iraqi military was the end user. The cases were approved because
an Iraqi Air Force official, along with a civil aviation official,
certified that the equipment would be used at civilian airports.
According to a State official, Iraq became ineligible to participate
in U.S. foreign military sales when it broke diplomatic relations
with the United States in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Its
ineligibility continued when Iraq was subsequently placed on the list
of terrorist-supporting countries. Consequently, no U.S. military
equipment has been sold to Iraq through the government-to- government
channel since 1967. Although removed from the terrorist-supporting
list in 1982, Iraq remained ineligible because U.S. policy
prohibited the sale of military items to either belligerent in the
Iran-Iraq War. Iraq was again added to the terrorist list in
September 1990.
U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICES
REGARDING SALES OF DUAL-USE
ITEMS TO IRAQ
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Dual-use items considered as strategic commodities and technical data
are controlled by the Department of Commerce under section 5 of the
Export Administration Act, national security controls. These
controls enforce the U.S. policy of restricting exports that would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any
country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to
the national security of the United States. Section 5(b) of the
Export Administration Act requires the President to establish a list
of controlled countries for national security controls. While
section 5(b) specifies that the controlled countries are those that
are contained in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, the President may add or remove countries from the list based
on certain criteria. Traditionally, the controlled countries have
been the former Soviet bloc and other Communist countries or state
sponsors of terrorism.
Iraq was not included on the original list of controlled countries;
thus, according to Commerce officials, Commerce had no legal basis to
deny Iraq any of the national security controlled items, unless it
believed that the items would be diverted to controlled countries.
Other dual-use items are controlled for foreign policy reasons under
section 6 of the Export Administration Act. Most foreign policy
controls relate to the broad issues of human rights, antiterrorism,
regional stability, chemical and biological warfare, and
nonproliferation of nuclear arms and nuclear capable missiles. Items
under antiterrorism control also include all the national security
controlled items destined for military end use. Therefore, if a
country is on the list of terrorist-supporting countries, as
determined by the Secretary of State, all national security
controlled items destined for military end use in that country would
be controlled because of foreign policy, even though the country is
not a controlled country for national security purposes.
Iraq was removed from State's list of terrorist-supporting countries
in 1982. A Commerce official told us that this made Iraq eligible to
purchase aircraft, helicopters, and national security controlled
items for military end use. A State document showed that within 2
months after Iraq was removed from antiterrorism controls, an
application by a U.S. firm to sell Iraq six aircraft was approved.
According to Commerce records, between 1985 and 1990, aircraft,
helicopters, and related parts, worth $308 million, were approved for
sale to Iraq.
Commerce officials told us that because Iraq was removed from
antiterrorism controls and because controls on missile technology and
chemical and biological warfare were not in place until the late
1980s, few foreign policy controls were placed on exports to Iraq
during the 1980s. They said that this, along with the lack of
national security controls, resulted in a long list of
high-technology items being sold to Iraq during the 1980s.
Commerce data showed that between 1985 and 1990, it approved 771
licenses, valued at $1.5 billion, for sales to Iraq, while only 39
applications were rejected. According to Commerce, another 323
applications valued at $442 million were returned to the applicants
without action, primarily due to incomplete information. Sixty-three
of the license applications were sent to State for foreign policy
review. State recommended approval for 58 and disapproval for 5.
Commerce acted in accordance with State's recommendations.
The bulk of the items licensed were computers and other electronics,
and other items such as civilian helicopters and machine tools were
also licensed. Dollar wise, the largest amounts involved three
licenses, totaling more than $1 billion for heavy duty trucks.
Commerce subsequently informed us that these trucks were never
actually shipped to Iraq. A Commerce official told us that Commerce
was informed by the exporters that the purchasers for these trucks
withdrew from the sales agreements at the last minute.
DIVERSIONS AND REQUESTS FOR
TRANSFERS TO IRAQ
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
One country transferred various U.S.-origin ammunition to Iraq
between 1981 and 1984, and another country probably transferred
U.S.-origin ammunition to Iraq in 1986, both without U.S. approval.
More recent data showed two additional cases of unauthorized
transfers of U.S.-origin items from these countries to Iraq. In
1986, one transferred U.S.-made ammunition fuses, valued at $8
million, to Iraq. The other transferred various howitzer spare parts
to Iraq.
In 1985, a European company sold weapon conversion kits to Iraq for
helicopters that Iraq had purchased from the United States with
assurance of nonmilitary use. While it is not clear whether the kits
contained U.S.-origin equipment, based on Iraq's earlier assurance,
the United States would not have approved the sale. However, it is
not clear whether or not the helicopters were actually militarized.
Two cases of arms diversion to Iraq involved Middle East countries.
A State official believes that so few Middle East diversions were
detected because Iraq was being well supplied with arms from other
countries. In 1984, State received reports that a Middle East
country had transferred TOW missiles to Iraq. Based on these
reports, State delivered a protest to that government. In 1986,
State received reports that Saudi Arabia had transferred U.S.
munitions to Iraq. In response to State's inquiry, the Saudi
government said that 300 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs were inadvertently
mixed in with a shipment of non-U.S. origin munitions sent to Iraq
in February 1986. State informed Congress of this unauthorized
transfer under section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act, citing it as
a small quantity of unsophisticated weapons.
In commenting on this report, the Department of State said that, with
the exception of the single transfer of bombs by Saudi Arabia, of
which Congress was notified in accordance with the Arms Export
Control Act, the State Department reviewed the other allegations of
unauthorized transfers to Iraq and did not find them to be credible.
Regarding State's comment, we are not privy to the information that
determined the reported transfers were not credible. Our discussions
of these cases are as they are reflected in the documentation we were
able to obtain. Moreover, in connection with one of the cases, we
acquired information, which remains classified, that indicates
additional quantities of items were transferred.
In five instances, third parties requested the United States to allow
them to transfer military equipment to Iraq. In 1982, a Middle East
country asked that it be allowed to transfer U.S.-origin howitzers
and C-130 aircraft to Iraq. In the same year, a European country
requested that the United States sell howitzers, and cobra and
Blackhawk helicopters to Iraq, using it as the intermediary. State
turned down both requests, citing the U.S. policy of not aiding
either belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War. In 1983, another country
requested battle tanks from the United States so that it could, in
turn, send its Soviet-made tanks to Iraq. According to a DOD
official, who was working for State when this request was made, the
United States turned down the request. In 1986, a Middle East
country requested the purchase of night vision devices for Iraqi
helicopters, using it as the conduit. In January 1990, another
Middle East country requested permission to transfer $400,000 in
U.S.-origin howitzer spare parts to Iraq. The United States turned
down both of these requests, again citing the policy of not aiding
either belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War.
DISPOSITION OF MORTAR FUSES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
In November 1988, a shipment of 4,000 M-734 mortar bomb fuses was
licensed by the State Department for sale by a U.S. company to a
military unit in UAE. The fuses were to be shipped first to a west
European firm, where they were to be installed onto 81mm mortar
bombs. Sales of the mortar bombs to the UAE unit were licensed
separately by the west European country's government. According to
the west European firm's shipping documents, the 81mm mortar bombs
containing the M-734 fuses were shipped in October 1989 to Dubai,
UAE, and arrived at the Port of Dubai in November 1989.
As a condition for obtaining the State Department license, the UAE
unit certified that the bombs containing the fuses were for its sole
use and would not be resold or reexported. However, in July 1990, an
allegation was made to Congressman Levine's office that the mortar
bombs had been transferred to Iraq. Subsequently, we were asked, as
part of the request, to determine whether this diversion had
occurred.
In February 1991, because of the Gulf War and the restricted travel
conditions, we asked the U.S. Embassy in UAE to inspect the mortar
fuses on our behalf. We provided the Embassy with the information
necessary to identify the particular shipment of mortar bombs
containing the fuses and to perform a physical inspection at UAE's
ammunition warehouse. The Embassy stated that it had made previous
inquiries about the fuses and had obtained documentary evidence that
the fuses were still in UAE's possession. The Embassy also pointed
out the political sensitivity of asking to inspect UAE's ammunition
warehouse. We then asked for the documentary evidence, which
consisted of a faxed reply from UAE stating that the fuses were
received in November 1989 and were for the sole use of UAE. This
information was not sufficient enough for us to be able to determine
the ultimate disposition of the mortar fuses. Therefore, in May
1991, we requested that the Embassy make arrangements for us to visit
the UAE's ammunition warehouse. The Embassy, citing the political
sensitivities, declined to make the arrangements.
Following the issuance of our classified report, the U.S. Embassy in
UAE sent us a cable. The cable stated that on July 7, 1992, Embassy
personnel fully and properly accounted for all mortar bomb fuses in
question. The Department of State also reported that the UAE
cooperated fully in the investigation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommended in our classified report that, because of the
Embassy's concern over political sensitivity that might result from
our visit, the Secretary of State should direct the U.S. Ambassador
in UAE to use an alternative method to physically verify that the
fuses are still in UAE's possession or obtain documentation to
demonstrate that they have been used for the purpose for which they
were provided. We also recommended that the Secretary of State
provide written confirmation of this verification and/or
documentation to our office. As previously mentioned, this
recommendation was addressed in July 1992.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We obtained written comments on a draft of the classified report from
DOD and the Departments of Commerce and State. (See apps. II, III,
and IV.) DOD concurred that the report is factually accurate and
provided no further comments. The Department of Commerce asked that
some additional data be added to the section on dual-use licensing,
which was done. The Department of State made some technical
comments, which have been incorporated in the report, as appropriate.
Subsequently, in response to our request for a declassification
review of the original report, the Department of State provided
written comments. (See app. V.) Its comments are fully reflected in
this unclassified version. However, we were unable to reach full
agreement with all the original classifying agencies regarding the
wording of this unclassified report version until December 1993.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
We conducted our review at DOD, the Departments of State and Commerce
in Washington, D.C. To obtain information on U.S. policies on
exports to Iraq, we met with officials from Commerce and State. We
also reviewed applicable statutes and regulations governing export
controls and Commerce's and State's publications. In addition, we
reviewed State's cables and memorandums, back to 1982, for any export
policy statement applicable to Iraq.
We obtained licensing information from Commerce for all applications
for exports of dual-use items to Iraq between 1985 and 1990. From
State, we obtained licensing information on all applications for
exports of munitions items to Iraq between 1983 and 1990. We also
obtained copies of some approved munitions licenses.
To determine whether there was a pattern of arms diversions to Iraq,
we met with export control enforcement officials from Commerce and
U.S. Customs, officials from State and DOD with expertise in Foreign
Military Sales, and intelligence officials from State and DOD. We
also reviewed DOD intelligence reports and State records, dating back
to 1982, for any diversion cases detected by the agencies.
To obtain information necessary for identifying the shipment of
mortar fuses, we contacted officials of the U.S. and western
European companies. We tried to arrange for a physical inspection of
the fuses at United Arab Emirates' ammunitions warehouse but were
unable to make arrangements with State because of political
sensitivities.
Our work was performed between August 1990 and September 1991 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
We plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its
issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other interested
congressional committees and to the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce,
and State.
Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
were Stewart L. Tomlinson, Assistant Director; Davi M. D'Agostino,
Adviser; and John P. Ting, Evaluator-in-Charge.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph E. Kelley
Director-in-Charge
International Affairs Issues
MUNITIONS LICENSES APPROVED
=========================================================== Appendix I
The following are 11 of the 19 approved licenses that we obtained.
Commodity Value Date End user End use
------------------ ---------- -------- ------------------ ------------------
Data privacy $1,105,159 7/27/90 Ministry of Securing embassy
device \a\ Foreign Affairs, communications
Iraq
Data privacy 25,291,119 7/27/90 Presidential Securing
device \a Office, Iraq presidential
communications
Data privacy 1,378,930 10/25/ Presidential Securing
device 89 Security Command, presidential
Iraq communications
Data privacy 29,577 8/15/89 Administrative Securing
device Officer, communications
U.N. Forces, Iraq
Speech and voice 198,400 8/02/89 Presidential Prevent
scrambler Security Command, eavesdropping
Iraqi Palace
Speech and voice 489,604 5/19/88 Presidential Prevent
scrambler Security Command, eavesdropping
Iraqi Palace
Communications and 165,860 7/07/86 President of Iraq To be installed on
navigations President's
equipment helicopter
Electronic 3,185 4/22/86 Iraqi Air Force Spare part for air
component traffic control
system
Communications 1,255,000 5/21/85 Iraqi Air Force To boost voice
amplifiers signals of air
traffic control
Revolvers and 914 9/28/84 Presidential For use by Iraqi
pistol Palace officials
Image intensifier 8,800 11/21/ Space and Research For astronomical
83 Center, Iraq spectrographs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a These are two of the four licenses that were revoked immediately
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 8/2/90. No items were shipped
under the four licenses.
Source: Department of State
An embargo was placed on him.
And then Clinton did this, the targets being only military:
The JCS chairman said the U.S. combatant commander responsible for the planning and execution of the aerial assault, Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command, was of the same opinion.
There were no U.S. or British combat casualties or aircraft losses--an exceptional achievement, in Zinni's view. "Even in peacetime, exercises of this scale can be dangerous and can be very, very trying; to do this without any casualties in the environment our forces faced was truly remarkable," Zinni said at a 21 December Pentagon press briefing.
More than 300 U.S. and British war-planes, spearheaded by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps squadrons operating at night from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise during initial missions on 16 December, flew over 650 strike and strike-support sorties against approximately 100 Iraqi military and military-related targets. Ten ships of the U.S. Fifth Fleet launched more than 325 Tomahawk cruise missiles, bolstered with an additional punch from more than 90 cruise missiles launched from U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers. Thousands of U.S. ground troops, augmented by hundreds of special operations forces, also were deployed to protect Kuwait or to carry out other unspecified missions."
Then the Republicans said this (SOUND FAMILIAR?)
Clinton Manufactured Iraq Crisis,
Violated Constitution
WASHINGTON, DC -- President Clinton, in launching the massive Dec. 16 attack on Iraq, used a manufactured crisis to deceive the American people, and to bypass Congress' power to declare war.
Warplanes aboard the USS Enterprise, combined with more than 200 cruise missiles from eight Navy warships, converged on Iraqi targets at 5:06 p.m. EST (1:06 a.m. Baghdad time). Over a four-day period, reports U.S. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, who oversaw the Iraq attack, 300 strike fighters, bombers and support aircraft flew 600 sorties, more than half of them at night. Another 40 ships took part in the attack, with 10 of them firing cruise missiles. More than 600 bombs were dropped, 90 cruise missiles fired from the air and another 300 from ships at sea.
The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) report Mr. Clinton used as cause for war, says syndicated columnist Robert D. Novak (Wag the Congress, The Washington Post, Dec. 21), contains six complaints cited by Richard Butler, executive chairman of UNSCOM. These complaints "reflect Saddam Hussein's obnoxious style but do not compare to more than 400 unimpeded inspections reported by Iraq since cooperation resumed Nov.14."
Mr. Novak provides an example of the type of incidents Mr. Clinton used to justify the attack on Iraq. "On Dec. 9 weapons inspectors from UNSCOM, acting on a tip, showed up without notification at the Baghdad headquarters of the ruling Baath Party to search for ballistic missile components. The Iraqi escorts, citing a 1996 agreement, said only four inspectors could enter."
The Butler report itself was a setup.
According to Rowan Scarborough of The Washington Times (Did White House orchestrate a crisis? Dec. 18), Scott Ritter, a former U.N. inspector, said Mr. Butler conferred with the Clinton administration's national security staff on how to write his report of noncompliance before submitting it to the U.N. Security Council. The former inspector said the White House wanted to ensure the report contained sufficiently tough language on which to justify its decision to bomb Iraq. "I'm telling you this was a preordained conclusion. This inspection was a total setup by the United States," said Ritter. Mr. Ritter resigned from UNSCOM in August, accusing the Clinton administration of interfering in how and when inspections were carried out.
The decision to attack Iraq was made before the Bultler report was submitted to the U.N. Security Council.
Reports the MacLaughlin Group (NBC, Dec. 18), that while the president told the nation Wednesday night that the attack was triggered by this Butler report, the "time line into the bombing itself shows that the president ordered airstrikes 48 hours before he saw the report."
Then of course, we did this:
Revealed: 17 British firms armed Saddam with his weapons
Investigation: By Neil Mackay Home Affairs Editor
SEVENTEEN British companies who supplied Iraq with nuclear, biological, chemical, rocket and conventional weapons technology are to be investigated and could face prosecution following a Sunday Herald investigation.
One of the companies is Inter national Military Services, a part of the Ministry of Defence, which sold rocket technology to Iraq. The companies were named by Iraq in a 12,000 page dossier submitted to the UN in December. The Security Council agreed to US requests to censor 8000 pages -- including sections naming western businesses which aided Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme.
The five permanent members of the security council -- Britain, France, Russia, America and China -- are named as allowing companies to sell weapons technology to Iraq.
The dossier claims 24 US firms sold Iraq weapons. Hewlett-Packard sold nuclear and rocket technology; Dupont sold nuclear technology, and Eastman Kodak sold rocket capabilities. The dossier also says some '50 subsidiaries of foreign enterprises conducted their arms business with Iraq from the US'.
It claims the US ministries of defence, energy, trade and agri culture, and the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories, supplied Iraq with WMD technology.
Germany, currently opposed to war, is shown to be Iraq's biggest arms-trading partner with 80 companies selling weapons technology, including Siemens. It sold medical machines with dual-purpose parts used to detonate nuclear bombs. The German government reportedly 'actively encouraged' weapons co-operation and assistance was allegedly given to Iraq in developing poison gas used against Kurds.
In China three companies traded weapons technology; in France eight and in Russia six. Other countries included Japan with five companies; Holland with three; Belgium with seven; Spain with three and Sweden with two, including Saab.
The UN claims publicly naming the companies would be counter-productive. Although most of the trade ended in 1991 on the outbreak of the Gulf War, at least two of the five permanent security council members -- Russia and China -- traded arms with Iraq in breach of UN resolutions after 1991. All trade in WMD technology has been outlawed for decades.
UNSCOM found documents showing preparations by the Russian firms Livinvest, Mars Rotor and Niikhism to supply parts for military helicopters in 1995. In April 1995, Mars Rotor and Niikhism sold parts used in long-range missiles to a Palestinian who transported them to Baghdad. In 2001 and 2002, the Chinese firm Huawei Technologies sent supplies to Iraqi air defence.
Foreign companies supplied Iraq's nuclear weapons programme with detonators, fissionable material and parts for a uranium enrichment plant. Foreign companies also provided Iraq's chemical and biological programmes with basic materials; helped with building labs; assisted the extension of missile ranges; provided technology to fit missiles with nuclear, biological and chemical warheads; and supplied Scud mobile launch-pads. Nearly all the weapons that were supplied have been destroyed, accounted for or immobilised, according to former weapons inspectors.
The Foreign Office said: 'The UK will investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute any UK company found to have been in breach of export control legislation.' The Department of Trade and Industry said details on export licences, including information on weapons sold to Iraq, was unavailable.
A spokesman for one of the British companies named, Endshire Export Marketing, said it had sold a consignment of magnets to a German middle-man who sold them to Iraq. Responding to claims that magnets could be used in a nuclear programme, the spokesman said: 'I've no idea if this is the case. I couldn't tell one end of a nuclear bomb from the other.' The company was included on a US boycott list in 1991.
He said the company considered the deal 'genuine business' at the time but that, with the 'benefit of hindsight', the firm would not have taken part in the deal. A spokesman for the MoD's International Military Services said he could not comment as no staff from 1991 were on the payroll and no documents from then existed.
Mick Napier of the Stop The War Coalition said: 'How can we support a government which says it's against mass murder when its record is one of supporting and supplying Iraq? This government depends on public mass amnesia.'
Tommy Sheridan, leader of the Scottish Socialist Party, said: 'The evidence of British armament companies, with central government support, arming the Butcher of Baghdad lays to rest the moral garbage spewed from the British government. It exposes the fact that Britain, along with America, France and Russia, armed Saddam to the teeth while he was butchering his own people.'
Labour MP Tam Dalyell said: 'What the Sunday Herald has printed is of huge significance. It exposes the hypocrisy of Blair and Bush. The chickenhawks who want war were up to their necks in arms deals. This drives a coach and horses through the moral case for war.'
Then of course this:
Report: No WMD stockpiles in Iraq
CIA: Saddam intended to make arms if sanctions ended
Thursday, October 7, 2004 Posted: 10:50 AM EDT (1450 GMT)
Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group, testifies Wednesday at a Senate Armed Services committee hearing.
According to a report by the CIA's Charles Duelfer, Saddam Hussein did not have WMD when the war began.
Duelfer appears before a Senate committee to testify on Iraq's weapons capabilities.
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and had not begun any program to produce them, a CIA report concludes.
In fact, the long-awaited report, authored by Charles Duelfer, who advises the director of central intelligence on Iraqi weapons, says Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and Saddam ended Iraq's nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War.
The Iraq Survey Group report, released Wednesday, is 1,200 to 1,500 pages long.
The massive report does say, however, that Iraq worked hard to cheat on United Nations-imposed sanctions and retain the capability to resume production of weapons of mass destruction at some time in the future.
"[Saddam] wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction when sanctions were lifted," a summary of the report says.
Duelfer, testifying at a Senate hearing on the report, said his account attempts to describe Iraq's weapons programs "not in isolation but in the context of the aims and objectives of the regime that created and used them."
"I also have insisted that the report include as much basic data as reasonable and that it be unclassified, since the tragedy that has been Iraq has exacted such a huge cost for so many for so long," Duelfer said.
The report was released nearly two years ago to the day that President Bush strode onto a stage in Cincinnati and told the audience that Saddam Hussein's Iraq "possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons" and "is seeking nuclear weapons."
and this:
The Top Ten War Profiteers of 2004
Center for Corporate Policy
December 31, 2004
1. AEGIS: In June, the Pentagon's Program Management Office in Iraq awarded a $293 million contract to coordinate security operations among thousands of private contractors to Aegis, a UK firm whose founder was once investigated for illegal arms smuggling. An inquiry by the British parliament into Sandline, Aegis head Tim Spicer's former firm, determined that the company had shipped guns to Sierra Leone in 1998 in violation of a UN arms embargo. Sandline's position was that it had approval from the British government, although British ministers were cleared by the inquiry. Spicer resigned from Sandline in 2000 and incorporated Aegis in 2002.
2. BEARING POINT: Critics find it ironic that Bearing Point, the former consulting division of KPMG, received a $240 million contract in 2003 to help develop Iraq's "competitive private sector," since it had a hand in the development of the contract itself. According to a March 22 report by AID's assistant inspector general Bruce Crandlemire, "Bearing Point's extensive involvement in the development of the Iraq economic reform program creates the appearance of unfair competitive advantage in the contract award process."
Bearing Point spent five months helping USAID write the job specifications and even sent some employees to Iraq to begin work before the contract was awarded, while its competitors had only a week to read the specifications and submit their own bids after final revisions were made. "No company who writes the specs for a contract should get the contract," says Keith Ashdown, the vice president of Washington, DC-based Taxpayers for Common Sense.
3. BECHTEL: Schools, hospitals, bridges, airports, water treatment plants, power plants, railroad, irrigation, electricity, etc. Bechtel was literally tasked with repairing much of Iraq's infrastructure, a job that was critical to winning hearts and minds after the war. To accomplish this, the company hired over 90 Iraqi subcontractors for at least 100 jobs. Most of these subcontracts involved rote maintenance and repair work, however, and for sophisticated work requiring considerable hands-on knowledge of the country's infrastructure, the company bypassed Iraqi engineers and managers.
Although Bechtel is not entirely to blame, the company has yet to meet virtually any of the major deadlines in its original contract. According to a June GAO report, "electrical service in the country as a while has not shown a marked improvement over the immediate postwar levels of May 2003 and has worsened in some governorates."
4. BKSH & ASSOCIATES: Chairman Charlie Black, is an old Bush family friend and prominent Republican lobbyist whose firm is affiliated with Burson Marsteller, the global public relations giant. Black was a key player in the Bush/Cheney 2000 campaign and together with his wife raised $100,000 for this year's reelection campaign.
BKSH clients with contracts in Iraq include Fluor International (whose ex-chair Phillip Carroll was tapped to head Iraq's oil ministry after the war, and whose board includes the wife of James Woolsey, the ex-CIA chief who was sent by Paul Wolfowitz before the war to convince European leaders of Saddam Hussein's ties to al Qaeda). Fluor has won joint contracts worth up to $1.6 billion.
Another client is Cummins Engine, which has managed to sell its power generators thanks to the country's broken infrastructure.
Most prominent among BKSH's clients, however, is the Iraqi National Congress, whose leader Ahmed Chalabi was called the "George Washington of Iraq" by certain Pentagon neoconservatives before his fall from grace. BKSH's K. Riva Levinson was hired to handle the INC's U.S. public relations strategy in 1999. Hired by U.S. taxpayers, that is: Until July 2003, the company was paid $25,000 per month by the U.S. State Department to support the INC.
5. CACI AND TITAN: Although members of the military police face certain prosecution for the horrific treatment of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison, so far the corporate contractors have avoided any charges. Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba reported in an internal Army report that two CACI employees "were either directly or indirectly responsible" for abuses at the prison, including the use of dogs to threaten detainees and forced sexual abuse and other threats of violence. Another internal Army report suggested that Steven Stefanowicz, one of 27 CACI interrogators working for the Army in Iraq, "clearly knew [that] his instructions" to soldiers interrogating Iraqi prisoners "equated to physical abuse."
"Titan's role in Iraq is to serve as translators and interpreters for the U.S. Army," company CEO Gene Ray said, implying that news reports had inaccurately implied the employees' involvement in torture. "The company's contract is for linguists, not interrogators." But according to Joseph a. Neurauter, a GSA suspension and debarment official, CACI's role in designing its own Abu Ghraib contract "continues to be an open issue and a potential conflict of interest."
Nevertheless, the GSA and other agencies conducting their own investigations have yet to find a reason to suspend the company from any new contracts. As a result, in August the Army gave CACI another $15 million no-bid contract to continue providing interrogation services for intelligence gathering in Iraq; In September, the Army awarded Titan a contract worth up to $400 million for additional translators.
6. CUSTER BATTLES: At the end of September, the Defense Department suspended Custer Battles (the name comes from the company's two principle founders - Michael Battles and Scott Custer) and 13 associated individuals and affiliated corporations from all federal contracts for fraudulent billing practices involving the use of sham corporations set up in Lebanon and the Cayman Islands. The CPA caught the company after it left a spreadsheet behind at a meeting with CPA employees. The spreadsheet revealed that the company had marked up certain expenses associated with a currency exchange contract by 162 percent.
7. HALLIBURTON: In December Congressman Waxman (D-CA), announced that "a growing list of concern's about Halliburton's performance" on contracts that total $10.8 billion have led to multiple criminal investigations into overcharging and kickbacks. In nine different reports, government auditors have found "widespread, systemic problems with almost every aspect of Halliburton's work in Iraq, from cost estimation and billing systems to cost control and subcontract management." Six former employees have come forward, corroborating the auditors' concerns.
Another "H-bomb" dropped just before the election, when a top contracting official responsible for ensuring that the Army Corps of Engineers follows competitive contracting rules accused top Pentagon officials of improperly favoring Halliburton in an early-contract before the occupation. Bunnatine Greenhouse says that when the Pentagon awarded the company a 5-year oil-related contract worth up to $7 billion, it pressured her to withdraw her objections, actions that she said were unprecedented in her experience.
8. LOCKHEED MARTIN: Lockheed Martin remains the king among war profiteers, raking in $21.9 billion in Pentagon contracts in 2003 alone. With satellites and planes, missiles and IT systems, the company has profited from just about every phase of the war except for the reconstruction. The company's stock has tripled since 2000 to just over $60.
Lockheed is helping Donald Rumsfeld's global warfare system (called the Global Information Grid), a new integrated tech-heavy system that the company promises will change transform the nature of war. In fact, the large defense conglomerate's sophistication in areas as diverse as space systems, aeronautics and information and technology will allow it to play a leading role in the development of new weapons systems for decades to come, including a planned highly-secure military Internet, a spaced-based missile defense system and next-generation warplanes such as the F-22 (currently in production) and the Joint Strike Fighter F-35.
E.C. Aldridge Jr., the former undersecretary of defense for acquisitions and procurement, gave final approval to begin building the F-35 in 2001, a decision worth $200 billion to the company. Although he soon left the Pentagon to join Lockheed's board, Aldridge continues to straddle the public-private divide, Donald Rumsfeld appointed him to a blue-ribbon panel studying weapons systems. Former Lockheed lobbyists and employees include the current secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, secretary of transportation Norm Mineta (a former Lockheed vice president) and Stephen J. Hadley, Bush's proposed successor to Condoleeza Rice as his next national security advisor.
Not only are Lockheed executives commonly represented on the Pentagon various advisory boards, but the company is also tied into various security think tanks, including neoconservative networks. For example, Lockheed VP Bruce Jackson (who helped draft the Republican foreign policy platform in 2000) is a key player at the neo-conservative planning bastion known as the Project for a New American Century.
9. LORAL SATELLITE: In the buildup to the war the Pentagon bought up access to numerous commercial satellites to bolster its own orbiting space fleet. U.S. armed forces needed the extra spaced-based capacity to be able to guide its many missiles and transmit huge amounts of data to planes (including unmanned Predator drones flown remotely by pilots who may be halfway around the world), guide missiles and troops on the ground.
Industry experts say the war on terror literally saved some satellite operators from bankruptcy. The Pentagon "is hovering up all the available capacity" to supplement its three orbiting satellite fleets, Richard DalBello, president of the Satellite Industry Association explained to the Washington Post. The industry's other customers - broadcast networks competing for satellite time - were left to scramble for the remaining bandwidth.
Loral Space & Communications Chairman Bernard L. Schwartz is very tight with the neoconservative hawks in the Bush administration's foreign policy ranks, and is the principal funder of Blueprint, the newsletter of the Democratic Leadership Council.
In the end, the profits from the war in Iraq didn't end up being as huge for the industry as expected, and certainly weren't enough to compensate for a sharp downturn in the commercial market. But more help may be on its way. The Pentagon announced in November that it would create a new global Intranet for the military that would take two decades and hundreds of billions of dollars to build. Satellites, of course, will play a key part in that integrated global weapons system.
10. QUALCOMM: Two CPA officials resigned this year after claiming they were pressured by John Shaw, the deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security to change an Iraqi police radio contract to favor Qualcomm's patented cellular technology, a move that critics say was intended to lock the technology in as the standard for the entire country. Iraq's cellular market is potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenues for the company, and potentially much more should it establish a standard for the region. Shaw's efforts to override contracting officials delayed an emergency radio contract, depriving Iraqi police officers, firefighters, ambulance drivers and border guards of a joint communications system for months.
Shaw says he was urged to push Qualcomm's technology by Rep. Darrell E. Issa, a Republican whose San Diego County district includes Qualcomm's headquarters. Issa, who received $5,000 in campaign contributions from Qualcomm employees from 2003 to 2004, sits on the House Small Business Committee, and previously tried to help the company by sponsoring a bill that would have required the military to use its CDMA technology.
"Hundreds of thousands of American jobs depend on the success of U.S.-developed wireless technologies like CDMA," Issa claimed in a letter to Donald Rumsfeld. But the Pentagon doesn't seem to be buying the argument. The DoD's inspector general has asked the FBI to investigate Shaw's activities.
And you still missed the point:
HE HAD NO WEAPONS ON MASS DESTRUCTION!!! Even BUSH said he didn't have any!! If he did have any he never used them against us.
The person they used to say he had WMD's was an informant and a known liar. There was no 2nd source! Is that how you commit almost 3,000 young men to death!!
and, though I could go on, there is this, which makes me sick!!
"So I don't know where he is. You know, I just don't spend that much time on him... We haven't heard much from him. And I wouldn't necessarily say he's at the center of any command structure. And, again, I don't know where he is. I- I'll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him."
—Bush, answering a question about Osama bin Laden at a March 13, 2002 news conference
What is ironic about the whole thing is that George Bush and others will be tried before the World Court for Crimes against Humanity as soon as this is concluded or Bush leaves office!!
You can take that to the bank!!