By bracketing the eight northeastern Indian states, with its diverse tribes, customs and cultures, into what is called the ‘Northeast,’ we tend to ignore the distinct identity and sub-national aspirations of these ethnic groups. More so, such clubbing together of the region, in an attempt to look at it as a single entity, has led to stereotyping of the problems that plague the area. The fact that each state has a different set of location-specific concerns and grievances often gets blurred in the scheme of things of policy framers and government leaders who are supposed to address these issues.
It is true that the region has as many as 30 armed insurgent organizations4 operating and fighting the Indian State to push demands ranging from secession to autonomy and right to self determination. Besides, there are a plethora of ethnic groups clamoring for their rights and distinct identity, making the region one of South Asia’s hottest trouble spots. It is also true that strategic alliances between rebel groups in the region often transcend inter-state and international borders. For instance, the United Liberation Front of Asom’s (ULFA) earlier links with the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) are well known. Currently, the ULFA’s deadly 28th Battalion, that has a crack bomb squad, operates out of NSCN (Khaplang) bases in Myanmar and Arunachal Pradesh. Again, the ULFA’s nexus with the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) was established beyond doubt with the busting of camps of these three rebel groups in close proximity inside Bhutan during the Bhutanese military assault on the insurgents in December 2003.
Having said this, it must be borne in mind that even these rebel alliances are only for military reasons, for the basic purpose of survival. The only commonality among or between them is that all of them are fighting the Indian State or symbols of the Indian State to push ahead with their respective agenda. But, none of them would agree to fight for the liberation of the ‘Northeast’ in general. After all, their main battle is for territorial supremacy over areas they seek to represent. The internecine battle between the Kukis and the Nagas in Manipur in the nineties, aided by insurgent groups representing both communities, is a case in point.
If attempts to club the region together and calling it the ‘Northeast’ is a problem, there are many other problems in the area, most of whom are the direct result of governmental insensitivity, administrative bungling or insensitivity of the Indian mainstream. Let me list a few of the problems or the trigger factors that have led to the problems in the region.
Complete lack of understanding of the psyche of the people of the region.
• Repeated, and even forceful attempts at assimilation of the region and its people with the so-called Indian ‘mainstream’ which, if anything, is absolutely alien to most parts of the region, and, therefore, considered by many in the region as not worth being a part of.
• Realization that an integrationist policy was not correct after all, has led the government to concede autonomy demands of ethnic groups, often leading to more such demands and aspirations.
• The lack of an institutionalized response mechanism with the Union Government to address emerging situations and thereby preventing their consolidation and transformation into popular agitations.
• The tendency to ignore emerging movements until the situation turns violent.
• The tendency to attach importance to agitations, whether armed campaigns or otherwise, by those groups which are more powerful or more violent.
• Total marginalization of the state police forces and increased dependence on the Army.
• Poor governance and lack of accountability of the officials and the official machinery engaged in ushering in development of the region.
• Corruption and leakage of development funds, directly impacting on the poor and the needy. There are instances and admissions by the Government of development funds reaching the insurgents in the region. 5
• Inability of the government to make the private sector open shop in the region in any big way.
• The extremely dangerous fondness to hold so-called peace talks with rebel groups, irrespective of their strength, social acceptance or relevance to local situations.
• Political instability of elected governments as in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh.
• Ineffective border management, and ineffective handling of the problem of illegal migration from across India’s borders.
• Insensitiveness of the media whose coverage of the region is violence-driven. This applies to the local, metropolitan or the international media, both print as well as electronic.